Introduction

Patterns of governance in contemporary U.S. higher education are being shaped by patterns of capitalism, academic style, as colleges and universities engage in market activities to generate revenues. Higher education’s structure and focus has increasingly been defined economically by “academic capitalism” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) and politically and culturally by “academic capitalism in the new economy” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). That entrepreneurial orientation affects the functions that are prioritized in governance activities. Relatedly, over time the structure of professional employment in the academy has also changed, from a point at which full time faculty were the dominant category to one in which the growth categories are part-time faculty and full-time support professionals who I call “managerial professionals” (Rhoades 1998a; Rhoades and Sporn 2002). That transformation also has implications for governance. Finally, connected to the above patterns, the past thirty years in U.S. higher education have seen a shift from an academy shaped by an “academic revolution” of increasingly powerful faculty (Jencks and Riesman 1968) to one shaped by a “managerial revolution” of increasingly powerful academic managers (Keller 1983) who are making faculty increasingly “managed professionals” (Rhoades 1998b). In short, capitalism, academic style, is reshaping the focus and forms of academic production and governance.

In the ensuing pages I elaborate on the implications of capitalism, academic style for governance in contemporary U.S. colleges and universities. I organize this discussion around three basic themes—that academic capitalism is (a) a cultural system, (b) a mode
of production, and (c) a mode of management. Each of these themes is developed with regard to structures and patterns of governance. I build on the American Association of University Professors’ (AAUP) model of shared governance, which has been central to the scholarly discussion of campus governance in the higher education literature.

Yet I go beyond mapping existing changes. The recent developments I describe pose challenges to faculty and non-faculty professionals’ involvement in governance activities that shape higher education’s work, as well as to the academy’s democratic purposes. Thus, I offer responses to the challenges, suggesting mechanisms that build on, yet modify the AAUP model of shared governance between faculty and administrators. My responses call on faculty, managerial professionals, and academic managers to renew the academy by establishing new and more democratic forms of accountability, in the functions served by, the patterns of participation in, and the processes of governance. What I offer is not a restoration of faculty’s position in shared governance relative to academic administrators; rather, I offer a conception of public interest professionalism grounded in more broadly democratic models of governance in U.S. higher education.

Literature Review

Two general areas of research frame this essay, literatures on governance in and the restructuring of U.S. colleges and universities, and the growing literature on higher education and the public interest. Higher education scholarship on governance has concentrated on formal mechanisms of governance at the level of individual institutions or of statewide boards (Berdahl 1971; Millett 1984). (A smaller body of work addresses
multicampus systems—see Berdahl 2000.) Most of this work has focused on decision-making responsibilities and structures, and on decision-making processes and policy environments (Braco et al., 1999; Martinez et al. 2002). The preferred outcomes are good decisions based on rationality and expertise, and good relations between the principal parties directly involved in governance matters.

In this paper, I consider governance issues at the campus level, where the prevailing model for many years has been shared governance. In classic articulations about “sharing authority effectively” (Mortimer and McConnell 1978) and “joint effort” (AAUP 2001), shared governance referred to a division of authority and decision making responsibility between faculty and administration, based on their distinctive sources of expertise. In some regards that ideal was expressed in the leadership of visionary presidents who established institutional direction and ensured financial security and then in collections of senior faculty who took on and institutionalized the “organizational saga” within their colleges, as Clark (1970) described in elite liberal arts colleges. The ideal was also expressed in the organizational form of strong faculty senates working with strong university presidents, epitomized in large, prestigious systems and institutions, the exemplars of which were elite public universities such as the University of Michigan and the University of California system (and several of its campuses). The configuration was essentially an internally focused, bilateral division of labor. There was little place in this schema for parties outside the campus or for those on campus beyond (or more accurately perhaps, below) tenure-track faculty and academic administrators.

However, the prevailing model of shared governance was challenged in the 1970s and 1980s, from both parties to the governing partnership. On the one hand, faculty in
many colleges and universities, particularly less prestigious public four-year institutions and community colleges, turned to collective bargaining in unions as a mechanism for gaining voice in institutional decision making. Such organization was most likely in those places that lacked any substantial form of shared governance. For some people in higher education unionization represented a fundamental threat to the collegial pattern of decision making embedded in shared governance. Thus, the rise of faculty unions led to studies of the relationship between faculty unions and faculty senates (Baldridge and Kemerer 1976). And research revealed an “unexpected peaceful coexistence” (Kemerer and Baldridge 1975) between these forms of governing. Indeed, in many unionized settings, faculty commitment to shared governance was such that a division of decision-making labor emerged between senates and unions, with senates having responsibility for a range of academic, curricular, and educational matters, and unions having responsibility for wages, working conditions, and a range of other non-academic matters. Moreover, embedded in the collective bargaining agreements were various management rights, recognizing academic administrators’ decision making realm. In short, unionization has accorded faculty in a wider range of institutions more decision making responsibility collectively in key financial (e.g., salary) and sometimes planning (e.g., reorganization) realms; it has actually extended though somewhat modified the shared governance ideal.

On the other hand, another challenge to shared governance came from academic administrators, from a “management revolution” (Keller 1983) that emphasized strategic planning and more administrative flexibility for meeting the new challenges to higher education. To many practitioners and scholars, as the defining conditions of higher education changed from growth to “reduction, reallocation, retrenchment” (Mortimer and
Tierney 1979), existing structures of shared governance seemed ill suited to making
“hard decisions” (Eckel 2000). Many came to think that making “wise moves in hard
times” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996) required more active management of higher education
enterprises. Much has been written in recent years about such pressures on universities,
expressed in a language of reengineering and redesign, of “restructuring for high
performance” (Tierney 1998) and “building the responsive campus” (Tierney 1999). For
the most part, pursuit of that path has involved strengthening managerial flexibility to
pursue new directions. The discourse has emphasized leadership from the top, criticized
resistance to change by faculty, and characterized shared governance as outdated and
insufficient to the task of strategic management in the current, challenging environment
(Duderstadt 2000). (Even scholars who are committed to a major faculty role in
governance have written of new forms of joint decision making that incorporate the
language of strategic management—Schuster et al. 1994)

The increasing pressure on universities to become more entrepreneurial is evident
globally. Comparative scholars have written about “adaptive university structures”
(Sporn 1999) and “globalizing practices” (Currie 2003) in Europe and the U.S., as well as
about “the enterprise university” (Marginson and Considine 2000) in Australia. In each
case, the adaptations involve changes in patterns of governance. Those changes have
generally involved the emergence of an increasingly powerful role in institutional
governance for academic executives and a relatively reduced role for faculty who have
been cast as obstacles to any significant change. This trend is so powerful, in discourse
and practice, that even when someone suggests an alternative perspective, their work may
be reinterpreted to fit prevailing understandings. For example, in mapping out the route
to transforming higher education organizations into entrepreneurial universities, Clark (1998) attributed key import to what he calls a “steering core” that includes and features faculty as well as managers. Subsequently, Clark (2000) has criticized the misuse and misinterpretation of his work (overemphasizing managerial flexibility); he has reemphasized faculty’s centrality, recasting his concept as “collegial entrepreneurialism”.

There is agreement among many scholars and practitioners that the need for managerial flexibility is related to the increased need for higher education institutions to be responsive to parties outside the academy (e.g., students, employers). But there is no discussion of mechanisms by which these parties can gain greater input in governance. Indeed, the push is really for institutions to more actively pursue their own financial self-interest, as a way of better meeting the needs of consumers and employers. The logic of the marketplace, embedded in college and universities’ pursuit of academic capitalism, is that the market rules, and through the operation of the market the best interests of the organizations and of society at large will be served. To the extent that the move to the market is linked to any governance process, it remains largely an internally oriented set of deliberations and changes concentrated on how best to facilitate responsiveness to and engagement with the market. Some of the mechanisms through which the market is to be engaged have been vetted through existing shared governance processes. Others of the structures, however, that have emerged to promote and manage academic capitalism were purposefully established outside conventional mechanisms of academic decision making, affording greater flexibility to managers and non-faculty professionals in these offices.

As colleges and universities have moved toward the market, some scholars have explored the implications in terms of the public interest. For the most part, this work
does not focus on governance. However, there are important exceptions. For example, although they do not specify the particular mechanism, Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that the future of higher education institutions lies in organizing them into more flexible units addressing practical social needs, a language that suggests greater managerial control of the formation, dissolution, and reformation of various structures that are responsive to the external world. Similarly, there have been studies of the ways in which academic leaders (generally academic managers) have created centers and institutes outside the existing structure and control of academic departments to enhance responsiveness; traditional academic structures and decision making processes are identified as restraints on responsiveness (Geiger 1993; Stahler and Tash 1994). Finally, there have been studies of negotiations between faculty and administrators over policy and practice in pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities (Rhoades and Slaughter 1991a; Welsh 2000).

But the largest body of work that considers the public interest and entrepreneurial higher education explores the general direction of colleges and universities and their faculty. Some of that work is focused on important but circumscribed empirical issues. For example, what types of entrepreneurial activities are faculty engaged in (Blumenthal et al. 1986; Louis et al. 1989)? What types of faculty activities are rewarded in terms of salaries (Fairweather 1994)? What are the patterns of expenditures in higher education institutions, and how are these related to the pursuit of new revenues through entrepreneurial activities (Gumport 2000; Pusser 2000; Slaughter and Leslie 1997)? In each of these cases, there are embedded questions about how the public interest is defined (Rhoades and Slaughter 1991b; Slaughter 1993) and the extent to which the broader public interest is served by such entrepreneurial activities of faculty and of universities.
Some of the most recent work on higher education and the public interest offers a more general commentary on the current, entrepreneurial trajectory of colleges and universities. A common theme running through most of this work has to do with higher education being taken over by foreign values of the private sector marketplace (Bok 2003; Gould 2003; Readings 1996). Scholars writing in this vein criticize higher education institutions and faculty for focusing too much on short-term economic functions (such as workforce preparation, continuing education, applied research and product development) and potentially revenue generating activities to the detriment of broader, more long-term and long standing core educational, social, scholarly, and public service functions and activities, which have to do with shaping, embodying, and serving key social and cultural dimensions of our democracy. In a sense, these commentators are calling American higher education into account for losing sight of key responsibilities in its pursuit of market activities and attendant revenues.

The above call to account, embedded in a critique of privatization and the zealous pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunity is distinct from a considerably larger literature on accountability in higher education. The latter literature concentrates on productivity and efficiency in higher education, in relatively narrow terms. For example, much of this work focuses on faculty teaching loads, calling faculty to account for paying more attention to research and their narrowly focused scholarly careers than on the needs of their students or of society in general (Massy and Zemsky 1994). Another strand of this work focuses on the performance of institutions, gauging their productivity in terms of measures such as graduation rates. In both cases the accountability literature in some sense applies the logic of the private marketplace to higher education: it looks to the more
effective control of employee (faculty) time and work, and the more efficient productivity of the enterprise.

By contrast, for the purposes of this paper I work out of a commitment to and a conception of democratic accountability, as it relates to literatures on governance and on the public interest. It is accountability measured by democratic purposes of higher education as well as by democratic patterns of participation in governance. With regard to the latter point, my perspective is, I hope, less backward and inwardly looking in defense of some past faculty privilege, than it is forward and outwardly looking in terms of new mechanisms through which to enhance governance. For me linking the literatures on governance and on the public interest is important. I am a political sociologist and a sociologist of the professions, so I believe systemic patterns and changes in the structure of professional employment and management have profound implications for shared governance in academe. But I am also the son of a theologian, so I am inclined to address questions of meaning, which as a sociologist translates into an interest in the socially constructed meanings that attach to the structural changes I identify.

**Academic Capitalism and the Changing Cultural System of Higher Education**

The first challenge to shared governance is in my view largely unrecognized, and has to do with the cultural system that attends to the expansion of capitalism, academic style, the push by colleges and universities, academic units, and faculty to capitalize on the intellectual products of academics’ intellectual labor to generate new revenue streams.
Although individual faculty members stand to benefit financially from this activity, the push organizationally stems from the pursuit of new revenues to enable academic institutions to better do their work and enhance institutional prestige. And typically, the push has to do with connecting to high-end markets that generate more revenue, more than with addressing the needs of mass markets, many of which have historically been underserved by higher education. That is capitalism, academic style.

In higher education we are increasingly commodifying not only the products of research, but also those of instruction, in the form of various educational materials and curricula. Our academic capitalism now extends beyond patenting and technology transfer, which is pursued by a relatively small number of faculty in mostly one type of institution, the research university. It now extends, as Sheila Slaughter and I (2004) have written in a forthcoming book entitled, Academic Capitalism in a New Economy, to curriculum and instruction, to the core educational function that touches all faculty and all higher ed institutions, through new economy mechanisms of service delivery, including on-line courses, course packages and materials, or distance education.

But I would go beyond even this. The challenge is that academic capitalism is more than merely a means of generating new revenues for institutions; capitalism, academic style, is a cultural system. It is not just an external threat, as many critics have written, it is an internal one. Capitalism shapes peoples’ consciousness, the way we think and talk about and define ourselves. This is true not only of more and more central administrators, of presidents who see themselves as CEOs, and would like to be paid accordingly. It is also true, increasingly, of more and more faculty, who see themselves as independent small businessmen, with their faculty salaries as their secure sinecures.
The capitalist consciousness is evident in strategic planning and reallocation processes, in the ways that faculty talk about themselves. There is a tendency in our discourse to conflate productivity with the generation of external revenues, and for people in fields that get lots of grants to talk of how they “subsidize” other fields. That pattern characterizes not only academic managers, but faculty (Gumport 1993). Anyone having lived through several rounds of strategic planning, as I have, can attest to various sorts of statements made by faculty about themselves and their colleagues. There are references to units “bringing in money,” without any acknowledgement of the public subsidies (in capital and labor costs, and direct institutional investments in research infrastructure) that make grants activity possible. And there are also references to units that “do not generate revenues,” without any acknowledgement of the tuition monies that many such fields bring in and yield with their large student numbers, high student to faculty ratios and low faculty costs (salaries).

The internalization of a capitalist consciousness is also clear in faculty negotiations surrounding intellectual property. For amidst the commodification of research and of instruction, we find that faculty are sometimes, even often, concentrated as much or more on the question of their share than on the question of the public good. The public is usually left out when the profits from academic intellectual property are divided up (Rhoades 2002). This is evident in intellectual property provisions, found in faculty handbooks, and in collectively bargained contractual provisions in unionized institutions. Currently, that is more true in the case of property that is patented than of intellectual products that are copyrighted (e.g., educational materials). In the case of the latter, many contracts give consideration to “Use”, to professional control over the quality
of the material, with an eye to quality and the public good; there are even contractual clauses that ensure no educational materials will be sold outside the institution for a profit (Rhoades 1998b; Rhoades and Maitland 2000). Relatedly, in the case of software, there are groups of faculty who promote and support “open-source” software that is available for free. Nevertheless, a major part of the negotiation between faculty and administrators in regard to intellectual property is about the inventor’s share of the material proceeds, which is articulated by many faculty as an important incentive for doing the work.

There are also less conscious and direct ways that academic capitalism is becoming embedded in the culture of the academy, in ways that directly impact shared governance activities. Infused in the context of academic capitalism is a heightened sense of needing to generate revenue, and of needing to be productive. At a very personal level faculty and academic administrators internally conflate revenue production and productivity in a way that affects how people allocate the scarce resource of their time. For example, surveys and interviews of faculty in recent years have revealed that faculty are spending more instructional time in class (generating student credit hours) but less in advising, and that as they are ramping up their research and instructional productivity, what suffers is not just leisure time but time devoted to service activities within the college or university (Leslie, Rhoades, and Oaxaca 1999; Milem et al., 2000). In short, participation in shared governance takes time. And in an environment of academic capitalism, time spent on shared governance is increasingly seen as unproductive in at least two ways, by faculty as well as by academic managers. First, it is time taken away from more “productive” activities. Second, it is time that in itself is often characterized as unproductive, yielding little in terms of clear, measurable results.
Thus, part of the cultural impact of academic capitalism is to focus more of the time and energies of professionals in the academy on economic production, and less on community service and involvement in democratic decision making processes.

So capitalism, academic style, has become a part of the fabric of our own identity and activity. And this is a challenge to the spirit of shared governance. Part of the aim of sharing authority between professionals and managers is to serve the public good, and to ensure that decisions are driven by careful consideration of the public good. The idea is that both parties, faculty and academic administrators, contribute perspectives that serve the public good. However, as both parties increasingly pursue academic capitalism, as they focus on and search for flexibility to capitalize on economic opportunities for revenue generation, that ideal is undermined.

Academic Capitalism and the Changing Structure of Professional Employment

The second challenge to shared governance lies in shifting perceptions of professionals, and in shifting patterns of professional employment. In the discourse and scholarship surrounding higher education, the first pattern is far more evident than the second one. For well over a decade there has been a consistent external critique and portrayal of faculty as self-interested careerists who have little commitment to their students and less to their institution. Faculty are seen not just as difficult to focus and slow to act, but as acting in self-interested ways, to the detriment of institutional and student interests. (Although such criticism is primarily relevant to professors in large public research universities, it also seems to be extended to all faculty). Such portrayals
undermine the legitimacy not only of faculty’s role in shared governance, but of the very concept and the decisions that come out of that process.

However, I think there is little understanding of a major contributing factor to this delegitimation that constitutes a fundamental challenge to faculty expertise in educational matters and to a two party model of shared governance. That is, the rise of a range of professions on campus that are not faculty and are not administrators, but instead are classified in the national data as “support professionals.” They are what I have called “managerial professionals” (Rhoades 1998b; Rhoades and Sporn 2002). They are increasingly involved in conducting academic work, including teaching; some are involved in evaluating or developing faculty’s instructional activity, and others work at applying and transferring faculty’s scholarly work into marketable products.

I call such personnel managerial professionals because they are professionals. They have advanced degrees, technical bodies of knowledge, journals, professional associations, annual meetings, even codes of ethics. But they are much more tied into management than are faculty, much less independent of managers. They are hired by supervisors, not by peers. They are evaluated by supervisors, not by peers. And they are fired by supervisors, not by peers. They are on eleven month contracts, like administrators, and they can be found in their offices on Friday afternoons, at 4:30, partly because they (and their supervisors) equate being in their office with getting work done.

These managerial professionals are part of the new economy of higher education. They are betwixt and between existing categories of employees emphasized in shared governance (faculty and administrators), much like in the private sector of the new, service and information based economy, technicians are an emergent category between
blue and white collar workers (Barley 1996). Like technicians, managerial professionals are the category of employment for which growth has been the fastest in recent decades in higher education. In other words, they are a significant, and growing, cost of production, a labor cost that generally is not considered by academic managers.

Managerial professionals are also increasingly involved in the production process. One example is the area of technology transfer, where various non-faculty professionals work with faculty to commercialize their intellectual property. Perhaps even more striking are those managerial professionals involved in the areas of instruction and technology. They make decisions that not only affect academe but are academic, representing a new claimant to professional expertise on campus. For example, most campuses have some or all of the following offices: Teaching Centers, Professional Development Offices, and Instructional Assessment Centers. The Directors of these units may be or have been faculty; but most of the professional staff have not, and never will be. These personnel are making decisions about and are involved in the production of software and multimedia packages utilized in the classroom, that impact instructional practice. And there is an emphasis on the use of technology in instruction, in part to get faculty to change their instructional practices and become more interactive and less didactic. These personnel challenge the legitimacy of faculty’s claim to be the source of professional expertise, and indeed the legitimacy of that expertise (e.g., in instruction); they also in a sense challenge the legitimacy of a two party model of shared governance, for they are professionals without a voice in governance.

The pattern I am describing is a global phenomenon. We can see it in Europe as well as in the U.S. The point is that management models have embedded in them new
costs and factors and production, which represent a challenge to faculty’s claim to be the only productive (and professional) employees in the academy, with all else being administrative cost (see Rhoades and Sporn 2002). So my point is that capitalism, academic style, is more than simply a mode of management, it is also a mode of production. And with entrepreneurial universities comes a new mode of production and organization of professional work, the rise of various non-faculty professions that represent a fundamental restructuring of professional work, not only in numbers, but also in terms of professional jurisdiction. That is not just a challenge to faculty’s jurisdiction in regard to instruction, research, and academic programs, it is also a challenge to a concept of shared governance that includes only faculty and administrators.

**Academic Capitalism and the Corporate Model of Management**

The third, and perhaps most widely recognized challenge to shared governance is the one identified by Joan Wallach Scott (2002) in the first AAUP annual Neil Rappaport lecture on Academic Freedom and Shared Governance—the rise of a corporate model of governance in higher education. That corporate management model has, in my words, increasingly made faculty “managed professionals”. In short, *capitalism, academic style, is a mode of management.*

Yet I think it goes beyond what Scott and many others talk about. The focus of much commentary and scholarship about corporate styles of management is on pressing needs in the rapidly changing context of higher education. There is a need for a more strategic orientation and focus. For example, the president at my university is promoting
a strategy of “focused excellence,” and he is fond of saying that academics are much better at excellence than they are at focus. Thus, the process of focusing excellence is largely led by academic administrators, with academic deans and the provost, in consultation with appointed, ad hoc, advisory committees of faculty, identifying strategic strengths and opportunities in which the university will invest. The process also involves identifying units and activities in which the institution will disinvest. The role of academic managers in this context is partly to corral the insatiable appetites of faculty and departments to grow, and partly to establish priorities, making “tough decisions” about reallocating existing resources and investing new ones. In a pattern that expresses the basic elements of the literature on restructuring, the justification for this administrative initiative is that there is a need for flexibility, to respond to changing external conditions and demands. There is a need for making decisions quickly. And there is a need for a focus, for a vision. The initiative to select and articulate the focused vision lies with academic management. Bennis (1989, 17) argues that leaders must have an “entrepreneurial vision.” And Leslie and Fretwell (1996) see it as “the presidential burden” to develop a vision. As the argument goes, traditional shared governance processes are simply not suited to these new challenges.

Amidst these changes, the structures of shared governance often remain in place. Although nationally, some institutions have eliminated faculty senates in recent years, or replaced them with larger institutional senates that include other constituencies, for the most part, faculty senates are a part of the typical four-year institution’s organizational landscape (this is not at all the case for community colleges) (see Minor and Tierney 2003). However, restructuring efforts often involve the creation of new, ad-hoc
committees and processes that essentially supersede the role of the faculty senate. In short, the new corporate style of management does not generally involve dismantling traditional structures of faculty governance; instead it involves a strategy of superseding these structures with new processes of decision making.

A range of such structures has been established within most colleges and universities. Some of these take the form of separate offices that have been established to address certain dimensions of academic functions of research and instruction but lie outside traditional mechanisms of faculty governance. For example, over the past twenty years, technology transfer offices, extended university structures (delivering courses at a distance), and instructional technology offices (affecting the ways in which teaching is delivered) have been established and/or expanded. Faculty involvement in, and oversight of such offices and activities is in most instances minimal to nonexistent. They represent new or extended realms of academic activity that are governed largely outside shared governance; they have been created and run largely through managerial initiative.

Other structures are embedded within academic units, yet are not subject to academic control. For example, many academic colleges within large universities now have advisory boards, generally populated by wealthy alumni, potential donors, and big businesspersons (this is most common in professional schools, particularly in schools such as business and engineering; but it is also becoming more common elsewhere—my college of education has its own advisory board). Part of the aim of these bodies is to support and raise money for the college. In addition, however, such bodies play some role in connecting colleges to large employers, which articulate their needs in terms of curricula, programs, and graduates. Generally, there is little faculty involvement with
these bodies. Again, then, corporate style academic management has led to the setting up of new structures that supersede faculty governance without directly challenging the principal symbol of shared governance on most four-year campuses, the faculty senate (or of faculty committee structures within colleges).

I think it is clear that, as Scott and many others have argued, the corporate model is a rejection not just of the mechanisms of shared governance, but also of its very principles. It is a rejection of the need for and benefit of the deliberation, chaos, and compromise of shared governance exercises. It is also a rejection of the faculty’s basic responsibility for a range of educational and curricular decisions, and of their right to share co-equally in decisions about academic programs and quality (Duderstadt 2000).

But I would take the challenge this corporate model offers academe even farther. The corporate model and its market oriented calculus, are shaping academic decision making in a variety of academic decisions throughout the institution. I detail key areas of these developments in, Managed Professionals (1998b). We are in a time period when market criteria are increasingly important relative to merit criteria in the most basic academic decisions. And this shift is linked to increasing managerial discretion.

Academic personnel decisions are increasingly shaped by market versus merit considerations. Salaries are a case in point. The collective bargaining agreements of faculty in unionized institutions reveal an increase in the number of provisions that connect salary to market considerations. In virtually all of these provisions it is academic administrators who make the judgment about whether and how (much) to apply market criteria to the salaries of faculty. (There are also an increasing number of merit decisions that are also controlled by academic administrators—indeed, that control was a focus of
the California Faculty Association’s successful opposition in regard to a merit pay proposal introduced by the administration.) In non-unionized settings one of the major issues surrounding salaries salary compression and inequities introduced by market adjustments for faculty who have letters of offer from other institutions.

Similarly reorganization processes are increasingly being driven by a “strategic” focus on investing in fields that are perceived to have a potentially large yield in terms of external revenues. Although reorganizations, and any retrenchment that results, are justified in terms of “academic reasons”, in collective bargaining agreements as well as in AAUP policy, what is going on is really a privileging of market over merit criteria in decision making about academic programs. Programs and departments that get downsized or cut may be very high quality units, even in terms of national rankings, but be in areas (e.g., education, social work, nursing, library science) that are not seen as being close to important corporate markets (though they may be very close to large student and/or employment markets) (see Gumport 1993). At the same time, programs and units that get increasingly invested in may not be academically meritorious but may be seen as having a large potential payoff in the corporate marketplace—in many institutions that is evident now in the case of biotechnology (Rhoades 2000). Decisions about such investments and reallocations often fall outside a shared governance process, even if some faculty are involved in the decision making in various ways. I would argue that faculty sometimes better understand niche opportunities and strengths than can central academic managers, who like corporate managers in the dot.com craze often move in a similar direction to competitors, rather than seeking distinctive competitive advantage (McDonald and Westphal 2003), as I believe is now the case with so many
universities pursuing the promise of biotechnology. Along similar lines, academic Deans are often not well positioned to identify and invest in small, niche, interdisciplinary opportunities that do not seem to “fit” within their particular portfolio. My point is simply that all knowledge about strategic opportunities does not lie in the minds of academic managers. The creative tension and innovative ideas that can come out of deliberations embedded in shared governance can, in fact, be quite strategic.

Another challenge to academe and to shared governance is the increased use of part-time and contingent faculty, with profound consequences for shared governance as part-timers are largely if not entirely cut out of that process (and as a disproportionate burden of governance activity falls to full-time faculty who are increasingly focused on productivity. Again, the logic of the market dominates, prioritizing short-term cost efficiency over other considerations. Without debating the loaded question of whether part-timers or full-timers are better at delivering instruction, the indisputable fact is that they are cheaper. Also indisputable is that with more office space, pay, and integration into the college community they would be more of a resource for students. But they would be a less easily managed workforce for academic administrators. And therein lay the logic and priorities of a corporate style of management to higher education.

It is also worth noting that the greater use of part-time instructional labor also affords administrators greater influence over the curriculum. In the case of distance education, for example, much of the instructional delivery is done by part-timers. And much is done on-line. In both cases, curricular offerings, as well as the type of teaching and instructional delivery, are shaped by administrators, as the process lies largely outside the standard processes of academic governance. Moreover, as extended
university and on-line, distance education initiatives are increasingly part of an effort to generate new revenues, offerings are shaped more by the perceived potential and the ebb and flow of short-term student demand than by any academic considerations.

So there is a challenge to conventional understandings of shared governance in the corporate style of management. There is a push for market over merit, for speed and flexibility over deliberation, debate, and compromise. And for a responsiveness to short-term and shifting external demands over being anchored in longer term and enduring commitments borne of academic understandings and discussions. Each of these patterns involves increased managerial discretion.

What I am talking about here is a shift in the balance of power between the two parties that have historically been part of the shared governance compact. That does not mean presidents are all powerful in a time of academic capitalism. In their own accounts, it is clear that presidents, and other academic administrators do not feel that they can make many of the decisions that they would like to make and that they believe need to be made (Duderstadt 2000; Rosovsky 1990). They see themselves as constrained by all sorts of structures and traditions in colleges and universities that limit the flexibility of academic executives, preventing them from acting in the way that corporate executives can. As someone who functions at lower levels of academic administration, as a department head, I fully understand their sense of constraint. And as a tenured full professor I fully understand the considerable compliment of power and autonomy enjoyed by senior faculty in particular. However, I am talking about patterns over time that are shifting the balance of these powers. Systematically, in the ways and processes that I have described above that balance is unmistakably shifting considerably in the
direction of academic managers, who may not have as much flexibility as they would like, but who have and are exercising markedly more than they have had in the past.

Beyond the Shared Governance Tradition Towards Democratic Accountability

Having elaborated the challenges to shared governance posed by capitalism, academic style, I now offer some possible responses. In doing so, I begin by considering the basic premises of the AAUP’s conception of shared governance. In answering the question of whether it needs to be reconstituted or reinvigorated, I will suggest some friendly amendments to the concept of shared governance. My amendments are fully supportive of the ongoing significance of the structures and accomplishments and protections of shared governance between faculty and administrators, as historically conceived. However, I believe that we need to modify and go beyond the premises and structures of shared governance, as it is typically conceived and enacted on college and university campuses. In providing some examples of ways that we might move beyond the existing model of shared governance, I ground my comments in the language of accountability, with an emphasis on the democratic nature of that accountability, in terms of the purposes of, participants in, and focus of accountability.

In considerable part, I believe this modification of our conceptions of shared governance is necessary because we have a different relationship to capitalism now than the academy did nearly 100 years ago, at the origins of the AAUP. There is a connection between the political economy of the country and patterns of governance within higher education (though I would not argue there is a simple “correspondence”—
Bowles and Gintis 1976, 2002—between the two, making higher education a reflection of the economy). Most scholars, functional and neo-marxist alike, have posed connections between industrialization and the rise and structure of the modern research university in the United States (Geiger 1993; Scott 1983; Trow 1973; Veblen 1918; Veysey 1965).

We are now in a post-industrial society (Bell 1973). As scholars map out the dimensions and implications of the information and service based new economy in which we find ourselves (Castells 2000, Schiller 1998; Webster 2002), it is time to consider what these profound shifts in the political economy mean for colleges and universities, for how they are oriented to basic social functions and responsibilities, for how professional employment is structured, and for how they are managed, (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

The notion of shared governance, as developed by the AAUP is the product of a particular social context and time. The conception and birth of the AAUP, and the collective advancement of a faculty role in governance, as well as the directly related claim of academic freedom for faculty, came around the time of the industrialization of the U.S. economy. It also came around the time of the rise of professions and their claim to scientific expertise (Bledstein 1976). Accordingly, the strategy of the emergent AAUP, was to base its claims to a role in governance and to academic freedom on its expertise, as a protection against the largely external threat of capitalism, which threatened and compromised the freedom of academics in their work (Slaughter 1980).

The emphasis on scientific expertise made sense in that context. It was consistent with the rise of professions in the Progressive Era, and the emphasis on expertise. It also made sense in that faculty were in the process of negotiating their claim to special expertise (Silva and Slaughter 1984). It even made some sense in regard to the deference
to administration, in their areas of expertise, given the widespread doctrine of scientific management. The strategy of emergent professions in this context was to accept existing hierarchies of managerial power and to ameliorate the excesses of such power through the application of informed, professional expertise through advice, policy development, or control over a delimited set of functions and range of activities. In this context it made sense for the model of shared governance to accord faculty a primary role in curricular and academic personnel matters because of their expertise, and to accord administrators a primary role in financial and strategic matters defined as their areas of expertise.

That model eventually took the shape of a formal statement on the Government of Colleges and Universities, formulated by the AAUP, the American Council on Education, and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AAUP 2001, 217). That initial 1966 statement indicated that, “The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the educational process” (221). The explicit rationale for faculty’s central role in these matters was both its professional “judgment” and “competence”. A wide range of remaining financial and non-academic areas are identified as being the responsibility of the president. Indeed, the president is seen as the source of change: “As the chief planning officer of the institution, the president has a special obligation to innovate and initiate” (221). Subsequently, in a 1972 statement on “The Role of Faculty in Budgetary and Salary Matters”, the AAUP provides as a basic principle the following: “Participation by each group (governing board, president, and faculty) appropriate to the particular expertise of each” (232).
Whatever the successes of this “joint effort” model, times have changed. On that point I agree with Keller (1983) and many other scholars and commentators who call for new governance mechanisms. Another century has changed, and it is time for us to modify our conception of shared governance in ways that make both faculty and academic administrators more accountable democratically to various external constituencies, and more inclusive of and accountable to other internal groups as well.

My first suggestion speaks to democracy broadly, and brings us back to the moral claim of professionals, and of not-for-profit institutions, that they benefit the public good. In a period in which higher education is characterized by academic capitalism in a new economy that is infusing the academy’s core functions and consciousness, academics, managerial professionals, and academic managers should reprioritize and reemphasize the academy’s role in creating various public goods. These goods involve engagement with the democratic aims of higher education in society. They should not be subsumed to a view of colleges and universities as engines of economic development for the corporate economy, and as economically successful enterprises. For this to happen, I believe that shared governance needs to be extended beyond the campus, that higher education needs to be more directly accountable to the views and input of a broader range of groups.

That means emphasizing the academy’s connection to constituencies in the external world through service for free, versus for a fee. It means not just connections not just to the private sector, but also to the philanthropic sector and to the social infrastructure of communities. One example of how to do this would be to ensure that boards of trustees and various advisory boards that connect institutions with the community include more than representatives of the private sector, that they entail a
fuller representation of the communities in which colleges and universities are situated. That would challenge our views of shared governance to include a broader range of constituencies and stakeholders and considerations than are currently considered legitimate. It would mean acknowledging the role currently played by representatives of large corporate employers, and ensuring a role for other external constituencies.

In addition to changing the membership of various governance and oversight bodies to be more democratically inclusive, it is conceivable that new sorts of bodies could be established. One example of such entities could be Councils for the Promotion of the Public Interest, which again would be comprised of a wide range of community and public interest groups and representatives. Such entities could be established by but independent of the college or university (not unlike the fundraising foundations that so many colleges and universities have established), with the express mission of tracking and encouraging attention to a wide range of local community needs and public good outcomes. Ideally, such bodies could serve as foundations for channeling challenge grants to institutions, providing seed monies for projects that would involve partnerships with local community and philanthropic groups working on a variety of social issues.

Another mechanism for featuring and promoting the public good would be for colleges and universities to create public trusts. Such trusts could be the repositories of a certain share of revenues generated by various academic and non-academic activities on campus (e.g., from technology transfer, distance education and courseware sales, monies from auxiliary units such as residence life). These monies could be administered by a combination of institutional representatives and persons from the community. The idea
would be to direct the monies to benefit local communities in clear ways, ranging from mechanisms for enhancing access to mechanisms for enhancing the quality of life.

The above mechanisms are simply examples of structures that might foreground once again the public good dimension of colleges and universities. I see this spirit as a key dimension of shared governance. With the expansion of academic capitalism in the new economy, joint efforts by faculty and academic administrators are driving colleges and universities more to the generation of institutional revenues and the pursuit of short-term institutional economic interests. The aim of the mechanisms I suggest is to transform the consciousness and spirit of the parties within the academy to attend more seriously and systematically to the promotion of the public good. Partly that can be achieved through the more systematic engagement of external parties.

A second suggestion is to extend our conception of campus democracy, academic style, which has been confined to academics, and to senior academics at that. Tenure track faculty are the propertied class of professionals in the academic republic. And shared governance is based on a two party system, with representation for track faculty and for academic administrators. But there are more than two parties on campus now.

Eighty years ago, professors were essentially the only professionals on campus. But as with the economy, times have changed. The growth area of professional employment nationally, in all sectors of higher education, is not faculty, and it’s not administrators, it is what I have called managerial professionals. Mechanisms of shared governance and strategic planning need to find ways to incorporate the input of these other professionals, these experts, in educational and other matters. Such processes will be insufficiently informed and incomplete if they do not take into account and
incorporate the views and expertise of these other professionals. Decision-making throughout the institution should be shaped more by a broader range of long-term professional than by short-term managerial concerns.

At the same time, a more democratic and representative range of faculty needs to be included in academic governance. It is not just the propertied faculty, the tenured faculty, who have knowledge of the organization. Other categories of faculty are where the growth is, where much of the diversity is, where much of the energy is, and also where a great deal of the expertise and knowledge about instructional (and research) work of the academy is. They should be part of our conception of shared governance, either through the creation of separate structures or through the incorporation of their participation and input through existing shared governance structures.

In both of the above regards the aim is to increase democratic accountability on campus for governance in higher education. Achieving such a goal requires enfranchising a wider range of professional employees (not to mention other employees).

My third set of suggestions relate to calling the traditional parties to shared governance to a more democratic accountability. From my standpoint, faculty’s (and other professionals’) claims to expertise are too narrow, and deference to administrative expertise is too broad. My third suggestion, then, is that (a) faculty should adopt a broader responsibility and rationale for involvement in governance (as should managerial professionals), and (b) academic managers be made more accountable for their actions to a wide range of internal and external parties. Both points suggest that we question narrow expertise and reemphasize the significance of democracy and democratic accountability as the touchstones of involvement in and evaluation of governance.
Let me start with the expertise of faculty, and then move to the issue of managerial expertise and accountability through traditionally conceived boards of trustees. Academe is no longer an emergent profession. It is marked by specialization that is extensive and intensive, even within fields of study (Metzger 1987), to the extent that scholars and policymakers emphasize the importance of cross/multi/interdisciplinary academic units that are part of a “new mode” of knowledge production more relevant to real world phenomena and problems (Gibbons et al., 1994). As academe has become more specialized, it has also become more focused on its expert role and less on some broader social role in regards to education. As Steven Brint’s (1994) work makes clear, what is happening with academe is happening with other professions as well: professions have shifted from a social trustee model of professionalism, with some measure of moral authority and commitment, to a model that emphasizes narrow, technical expertise, in the service of ends defined by others (some scholars have argued this has always been true of the academic profession—see Silva and Slaughter 1984—but the pattern has become more exaggerated over time). In an entrepreneurial age of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, that is even more the case.

In the context of such extensive and extraordinary specialization (and often, of such self-serving entrepreneurial activity), faculty’s claims to educational expertise become increasingly narrow, especially at the undergraduate level, and even more so in the general education curriculum. It may seem strange for me, then, to suggest that faculty should articulate a strengthened and broadened role in curricular, strategic, and financial matters. But I believe it is important for academics to reemphasize and reassert the broader role of faculty as professionals and educators, as well as knowledge creators,
and to reestablish the moral authority that comes with that in terms of faculty’s long term commitment to quality and to education that will benefit students in the long run. To regain that broader vision I believe faculty need to play a broader role in governance. That role should not and cannot be based on expertise in the particular area of decision making but on the principle of economic democracy, the rights of employees to participate in decision making that affect their lives, and the lives of their clients.

Therein lies the essence of professional’s social compact with society, to prioritize the interests of their clients over their own commercial gain. It is a commitment to a different bottom line than one has in the private marketplace. Currently, when so many professionals work in large organizations, and in not-for-profit organizations that are increasingly behaving like commercial enterprises, part of that social compact must be to prioritize the interests of professionals clients over the institution’s interests in interacting with “customers.” This is true of managerial professionals as well. They should come to see themselves as agents of their clients more than of the institutions that employ them.

Let me draw a parallel to medicine. There has been much criticism of physicians, as there has been of faculty. In my view, much of that criticism is justified. That criticism has facilitated the rise of corporatization, in medicine as in higher education. Nevertheless, as we have gone down the road of privatization of health care, is there anyone who really doubts whether, on balance, physicians have the patients interests more as their bottom line than do the CEOs of HMOs? I think not. And I think it is not too hard to see that the same might be true of higher education institutions. The principal role of academic managers, particularly as they increasingly conceive of themselves as CEOs, is to protect the interests of the institution and to enhance its revenue and prestige,
goals not always coterminous with serving the needs of students. That is even more the case in a time of increasingly entrepreneurial universities and of academic capitalism.

There are many mechanisms through which expanded faculty participation in institutional planning could be implemented. For higher education scholars the most obvious mechanism is likely to be seen as the faculty senate, on which much has been written about its latent functions (Birnbaum 1989) and manifest dysfunctions (Tierney 2001) of such bodies. In addition, there are a range of other organizational/structural mechanisms through which influence could be channeled, ranging from the participation of elected faculty in presidential cabinets to task forces with particular planning charges to various forms of interest based collective bargaining of key strategic and financial issues. The challenge confronting any of these structural solutions are at least twofold—the perspective of many faculty that they are representatives of particular units, and the insufficient information and knowledge of many faculty about the workings of higher education institutions. The former is an ongoing problem that can be partially addressed in the ways in which faculty are selected and charged. The latter is a problem that could be addressed by the development of a support infrastructure that would enhance the information available to faculty, and the scope of their expertise and vision.

Each of the above ideas, whether applied to faculty or managerial professionals, consist of sort of a corporatist arrangement in which groups have voice in certain central planning bodies. There are other possibilities, however, for better informing strategic planning processes with a broader range of ideas. For example, institutions might consider utilizing mechanisms that afford wider opportunity for individual and groups of professionals to offer ideas and insights with regard to institutional direction, “trickle up”
mechanisms that look to foster and support locally generated initiatives and ideas. Too often, in current configurations of strategic planning and decision making this consists of some sort of open town hall meetings where faculty and other staff can ask questions. But these are very ineffective mechanisms for soliciting ideas and input, as they generally involve academic managers seeking to convince and persuade staff of the value of a path already being pursued in the institution. We must more creatively look for ways to solicit and seriously consider in our governance processes, a wider range of input. In some sense, such mechanisms should make decision makers more accountable in some systematic way, to the ideas and feedback of the people within their organization.

In the case of academic managers, I believe there are some very specific mechanisms of accountability that should be established, not to inhibit initiative, but to provide managers with ongoing feedback as to how initiatives are being received and acted upon. Nationally, it is clear that one of the next major pushes in federal legislation and practice regarding higher education will be to establish simple outcome measures for colleges and universities (e.g., graduation rate) and to measure institutions accordingly, with financial consequences for various types of evaluation. The push is not unlike what has taken place in regard to the evaluation of faculty. In combination, neo-liberals and neo-conservatives in society would have all public sector entities become like private sector enterprises and hold us all accountable for certain simplistically defined, efficiency measures. Although I do not fully support such an approach to educational institutions and personnel, I do not see why academic managers should be exempt from the pattern. Thus, I believe it is time for senior academic administrators to be held accountable for their actions, in a way that goes beyond the last resort of simply firing them if Boards or
faculty are unhappy with some dimension of their performance. We need to develop a range of performance and evaluation measures for academic managers, and to monitor and hold them accountable democratically, internally and externally, for their activities. And the compensation of these managers should be connected to their evaluation.

At the very least, performance criteria should relate to the express mission of the institution, such as increasing access and quality education to prospective students in a region or serving the local or state community. They should also attach to the objectives and claims set for the institution by the academic administrator in question. There are various mechanisms by which such an assessment could be undertaken. In my view, the particular mechanisms for conducting such administrative evaluations should vary by context—for example, by institutional type, size, and other criteria. However, it is clear that Boards of Trustees and annual reports and State of the University addresses are not sufficient to the task. Several problems with the current pattern of occasional review by a board are evident. First, despite the not uncommon conflict between boards and presidents, it is also not uncommon for boards to function largely as boards of directors, becoming closely aligned with their CEOs. Second, boards are relatively limited in terms of the types of groups that are represented on them. A large number of constituencies, internal as well as external to the institution, have little direct involvement in reviewing senior academic administrators. Third, the periodic reviews (often at 5 year intervals, for example) do not give the sort of ongoing feedback to academic managers that could be useful in the early identification and addressing of emergent problems.

In place of such periodic reviews by the board, I would suggest some form of annual review for senior academic administrators. Although I understand the time and
energy involved, much the same could be said of the annual review of faculty and of other professional personnel. Accountability takes time. In order for such evaluations to be useful, for both the reviewing constituencies and for the administrator, it makes sense for feedback to come from various constituencies. For example, the review of a provost or president should include the equivalent of teaching evaluations from deans, faculty, students, staff, community groups, and other external constituencies with which they interact regularly. Moreover, objective measures of performance should be developed as well, related at least in part to the performance of the institution.

In short, academic managers should be democratically accountable for their performance. My suggestion is offered not in the spirit of believing that administrators should be weak, or handcuffed. Rather, I think the strongest institutions are those in which faculty and academic administrators are both strong, in which there is a creative tension and exchange between them, and in which administration’s redefine their role to focus on service, synthesis, and synergy, and in which administrators receive regular feedback on the ways in which various constituencies view and evaluate them. And I believe the work and decision making of these two parties will be further enhanced by incorporating the input of a wider range of constituencies in governance.

I understand that my ideas run counter to prevailing views that the problem with higher education institutions is that executives cannot move quickly or flexibly enough to execute their vision. But I think there are several other problems in managing these institutions that are not sufficiently considered in the current discourse. For example, there are various pressures that academic managers face which work against their ability to reflect and work on medium and long term goals. The increasing pressures confronted
by senior academic administrators frame and encourage a short-term perspective focused on narrow goals and immediate payoffs. Academic capitalism and the fiscal stress being experienced by most higher education institutions further narrow the field of vision. In addition, although by virtue of their position and role, senior academic administrators are said by some to have a broader perspective than do others within the organization, for the above reasons and more, I think the nature of that perspective is unfortunately more restricted than we understand. Due to size and increased complexity of higher education institutions, it is enormously difficult for academic managers to fully understand the work and opportunities of the faculty and programs in the institution (Rhoades 2000). Nor do most academic administrators have any formal training or particular expertise in the managerial activities in which they are engaged (e.g., planning and budgeting). The relatively short average tenure for senior academic managers makes this situation even more problematic (and in my view, makes it more important for them to call upon the varied expertise of faculty and managerial professionals in planning and budgeting).

As a final point along these lines, more and more, presidents and academic administrators confront the pressure to act in a short-term time frame. In part, it is this pressure, as expressed for example in external demands for rapid organizational change, that has led so many scholars and practitioners to claim that shared governance is not adapted to the current needs of academic managers, that it makes decision making too cumbersome and organizations insufficiently responsive and adaptable. From this perspective, managers need greater flexibility, greater room to act decisively and quickly. However, I find the claim that we need to enable academic managers to have the flexibility to move as rapidly as do managers in the private sector truly remarkable. It is
remarkable given the longstanding critique of private sector managers’ short-term orientation and myopia. It is particularly remarkable given the recent economic (and ethical) debacles in private industry, and the lessons these hold about unbridled authority for managers and about overly rapid and insufficiently circumspect decisions regarding investment and allocation of resources. The recent problems in the U.S. economy would seem to suggest not that managers need to be able to move more quickly and make faster decisions but rather that what is needed is more careful consideration of, deliberation on, and evaluation of actions and decisions.

Conclusion: A Democratically Accountable Academy

To sum up my thesis, the current era of capitalism, academic style, offers three major challenges to the conventional practice of shared governance between faculty and academic administrators. First, as a cultural system academic capitalism in the new economy is becoming embedded in the consciousness of faculty and academic managers and realigning their commitments, activities, and decision making with regard to the basic work and functions of the academy—research, education, and public service. Second, as a model of organizing production, capitalism, academic style has contributed to the substantial growth of new categories of professionals, who are involved in the basic work of the academy but are largely disenfranchised from the decision making surrounding that work and the governance of the institution. Third, as a model of managing organizations, academic capitalism has involved expanded flexibility for
academic managers relative to faculty in decision making, and it has foregrounded the exercise of that flexibility in pursuit of the institution’s short-term financial interests.

Despite my belief in the value of a central, ongoing role for faculty in institutional governance, I do not believe that in its conventional configuration shared governance is up to the three challenges delineated above. Indeed, I would go well beyond the existing managerial critique of the decision making model, and argue that a shared governance which is grounded in a narrow conception of faculty expertise in a particular area of research or instruction is not sufficient to the task of ensuring: (a) broad faculty involvement in key governance decisions, (b) involvement of non-faculty professionals in governance, or (c) democratic governance oriented to the public good, to the public functions of higher education.

Instead of a return to shared governance that features (senior) full-time faculty and (senior) academic administrators, I offer a challenge to the academy, calling on various parties to imagine and fashion new forms and practices of governance that will make higher education more democratically accountable. In a time of economically oriented entrepreneurial activity, I call for a “public interest professionalism,” for a socially oriented entrepreneurial orientation that takes as its bottom line not revenue generation but enhancement of society, socially, culturally, politically, and educationally.

In response to the challenge posed by the growing capitalist consciousness and mentality among faculty as well as administrators, we need to ensure that there are mechanisms of accountability that reemphasize higher education institutions’ role in contributing to the public good. Such mechanisms could include public trusts of institutionally generated revenues that would be devoted to public interest activities, as
well as affiliated councils promoting the public interest, which should include representatives of not-for-profit entities and community groups. These councils should work with colleges and universities to encourage and evaluate the institution’s contribution to its surrounding communities. Beyond these structures and mechanisms I am also suggesting that faculty and other professionals on campus need to reprioritize a professionalism that emphasizes a broader sense of expertise and social responsibility, as professionals whose commitment is to the public good and who care about education more than about profit.

In response to the challenge posed by the capitalist mode of production that involves the emergence of new non-faculty professions and non-tenure-track faculty, we need to expand academic democracy beyond the two-party system of faculty and administrators to include new professionals and non-propertied faculty. Increasingly, these professionals are involved in the basic academic work of colleges and universities. And their work is interconnected with that of full-time, tenure-track faculty. As with faculty, my premise is that these employees have important insights into the strategic dimensions and opportunities of their work that are currently being overlooked. In institutions now characterized by interconnected, interdependent, and patterns of work that cut across the boundaries of academic and non-academic units, these employees should be given a voice in matters of institutional governance. In short, we need a broader definition of academic democracy.

In response to the challenge posed by the capitalist mode of management in higher education, we need to expand faculty (and other professionals’) involvement in governance, beyond the traditional boundaries of shared governance, beyond the
boundaries of faculty senates to other offices and structures that have been established and that influence the academic activities of colleges and universities. We also need to ensure that academic managers are more democratically accountable, for example in annual evaluation processes that would enable them to better track their performance, and inform them in ways that could enhance institutional performance. Part of that democratic accountability should be a greater balance of attention between criteria related to the organization’s economic efficiency and productivity and those related to managers’ contributions to democratizing the performance and processes of the organization.

As I have grounded so much of my discussion in the AAUP’s conception of shared governance, I’d like to go back to address that organization’s origins, as a way of clarifying the mentality that I think needs to be not just recaptured but extended. One of the key academic cases that gave rise to the AAUP, and fashioned its role in regard to academic freedom and governance was that of Edward Ross, a Stanford professor who was fired at the urging of Jane Lathrop Stanford, Leland Stanford’s widow. One need not glorify Ross, nor gloss over his anti-immigrant, even racist views of the Chinese, to recognize that his firing, like that of several other professors of that time, had much to do with his political positions that were critical of prevailing corporate elites and industries and that supported the legitimacy of workers forming unions and of legislation outlawing child labor and protecting workers’ rights (after all, the harsh exploitation of, and thousands of deaths suffered by immigrant and other laborers’ on the railroads, is well known). In Ross’ time, several of his colleagues, in other departments, resigned in protest. If we fast forward to the Cold War, after the AAUP had published its positions on academic freedom and shared governance, and in a time when many if not most
universities had faculty senates, instead of resigning, Ross’ colleagues might have followed standard shared governance procedures and recommended that Ross be censured for anti-capitalist, communist sympathizer sentiments (see Lewis 1993; Schrecker 1986). In our current period of academic capitalism in a new economy, some of Ross’ colleagues might be on an ad hoc advisory committee reviewing academic programs in a strategic reallocation process of focusing excellence, and would have recommended, in support of the Deans and the Provost, that Ross’ program be reorganized, curtailed, or eliminated because it was not a revenue producing program and was not strategically positioning itself to attract external revenues. In other words, it’s not just the structure the matters. It’s also the substantive cultural and institutional commitment to a democratic, public good role for higher education that values debate, dissent, and diversity, over short-term efficiency and expert management. In my view, that is an important dimension that we need to reincorporate into contemporary governance in American higher education.

Bibliography


Jencks, Christopher, and David Riesman. 1968. The academic revolution New York: Doubleday.


